Los últimos soldados del Restaurador: Movilización militar y miliciana hacia el ocaso del rosismo

The present article provides a comprehensive analysis and description of the recruitment and mobilization of soldiers and militiamen by the Rosist government in response to the invasion of the Grand Army led by Justo José de Urquiza. However, it is not intended to revisit the figure of Juan Manuel de Rosas, the generals or the Battle of Caseros itself, all of which have recently been explored by historians. Instead, the focus is shifted towards the approximately 25,000 men who were also defeated on February 3rd, 1852.More mythological than proven images have been constructed about the porteño troops under De Rosas' command. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to achieve a solidly documented description that may respond to a series of questions, simple to pose but difficult to answer, in a satisfactory manner: How was the Buenos Aires army that fought at Caseros formed? Who were the men who put their bodies on the line? How old were they, where were they from, what was their marital status, what was their occupation? How were they recruited and mobilized? How many were they in relation to the population susceptible to take up arms? What was their preparation and equipment to face that crucial confrontation? Did they resist their recruitment? In other words: the aim of this paper is to demarcate the (inevitably working-class) world of those who integrated the Buenos Aires army in that torrid summer morning.In order to respond to these questions, a documentary corpus still largely unexplored by historiography was thoroughly examined. This made it possible to formulate a number of conjectures and establish certain conclusions about the modalities of warfare, the nature of the contenders and the resulting loyalties, solidarities and collective identities. In light of the latter, plausible reasons will be sought to explain why, during the Battle of Caseros, several of those who should have swung their swords and pulled the triggers of their rifles, either did not do so or did not put the greatest possible effort into the combat. These attitudes caused part of the Buenos Aires army to put up a weak and meager resistance to the invaders, an issue that intrigued both the protagonists and historians for generations. El artículo presenta una descripción y análisis detallado sobre el reclutamiento y la movilización de milicianos y soldados realizadas por el gobierno rosista con el objetivo de afrontar la invasión del Ejército Grande liderado por Justo José de Urquiza.