El producto del autoengaño: Un análisis crítico de la propuesta de n. Van leeuwen
Self-deception is an intriguing and complex phenomenon, which has been extensively discussed in the philosophical field. There is a widespread lack of consensus regarding most of its aspects; however, there is one thesis which is widely accepted: the idea according to which the product of self-decep...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica 2023, Vol.10 (1), p.107-127 |
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Zusammenfassung: | Self-deception is an intriguing and complex phenomenon, which has been extensively
discussed in the philosophical field. There is a widespread lack of consensus regarding
most of its aspects; however, there is one thesis which is widely accepted: the idea
according to which the product of self-deception is a belief. Many of the authors who
have accepted this thesis implicitly take for granted that it is not necessary to carry out
a systematic analysis of the characteristics of this propositional attitude. This seems
to be due to the fact that they judge that it consists on a folk-psychological concept
and that, as such, it can be intuitively and automatically comprehended. We consider
that this constitutes an argumentative deficit, and we present a possible source of
this deficit. Afterwards, we analyze the ideas advanced by a prolific contemporary
author, N. Van Leeuwen, because we consider that his proposal overcomes the deficit
at issue. However, his perspective is affected by some difficulties; we identify and
examine those difficulties, and we conclude that, because of them, Van Leeuwen is
not able to satisfactorily answer the question about the product of self-deception.
Finally, we present three possible answers to this question, highlighting the virtues
of the third answer.
El autoengaño es un fenómeno intrigante y complejo, que ha sido extensamente dis-
cutido en el ámbito filosófico. Impera el disenso en el abordaje de la mayoría de sus
aspectos; empero, existe una tesis que sí goza de amplio consenso: aquella según la
cual el producto del autoengaño consiste en una creencia. Muchos de los autores que
han aceptado esta tesis dan por sentado, implícitamente, que no se requiere un aná -
lisis sistemático sobre las características de dicha actitud proposicional. Esto parece
deberse a que juzgan que se trata de un concepto folk-psicológico y que, en tanto que
tal, se lo comprende intuitiva y automáticamente de manera adecuada. Consideramos
que esto constituye una falencia argumentativa, y presentamos un posible origen de
dicha falencia. Posteriormente, analizamos los planteos de un prolífico autor con-
temporáneo, N. Van Leeuwen, puesto que consideramos que su propuesta supera la
falencia en cuestión. Sin embargo, su perspectiva presenta ciertos inconvenientes;
identificamos y examinamos dichos inconvenientes, y concluimos que, como resul-
tado de éstos, Van Leeuwen no logra responder satisfactoriamente la pregunta acerca
de cuál es el producto del a |
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ISSN: | 2386-8066 |