The proportional partitional Shapley value

A new coalitional value is proposed under the hypothesis of isolated unions. The main difference between this value and the Aumann–Drèze value is that the allocations within each union are not given by the Shapley value of the restricted game but proportionally to the Shapley value of the original g...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Discrete Applied Mathematics 2015-05, Vol.187, p.1-11
Hauptverfasser:	Alonso-Meijide, José María, Carreras, Francesc, Costa, Julián, García-Jurado, Ignacio
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	(TU) cooperative game 91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences 91A Game theory Aumann–Drèze value Classificació AMS Coalition structure Cooperative games (Mathematics) Game theory Investigació operativa Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) Jocs, Teoria de Matemàtiques i estadística Shapley value Teoria de jocs Àrees temàtiques de la UPC
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	A new coalitional value is proposed under the hypothesis of isolated unions. The main difference between this value and the Aumann–Drèze value is that the allocations within each union are not given by the Shapley value of the restricted game but proportionally to the Shapley value of the original game. Axiomatic characterizations of the new value, examples illustrating its application and a comparative discussion are provided.
ISSN:	0166-218X 1872-6771
DOI:	10.1016/j.dam.2015.01.031