Population Monotonicity in Public Good Economies with Single Dipped Preferences

We study public good economies with variable population. We consider the problem of locating a single public good along a segment when agents have single dipped preferences. We analyze population monotonicity along with the standard properties Pareto efficiency, continuity and no-veto power. We show...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:International journal of economics and finance 2016-03, Vol.8 (4), p.80
1. Verfasser: Gursel Tapki, Ipek
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:We study public good economies with variable population. We consider the problem of locating a single public good along a segment when agents have single dipped preferences. We analyze population monotonicity along with the standard properties Pareto efficiency, continuity and no-veto power. We show that there is no rule satisfying these properties together.
ISSN:1916-971X
1916-9728
DOI:10.5539/ijef.v8n4p80