Constitutive rules of precedent: A non-prescriptivist account of stare decisis

The purpose of this paper is to reject the thesis that a system of precedent is established with a prescriptive norm. This claim is supported by two lines of reasoning. First, it is claimed that systems of precedent necessarily require constitutive norms and not prescriptive norms. Second, any syste...

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Veröffentlicht in:Revus (Ljubljana, Online) Online), 2022, Vol.46
1. Verfasser: Núñez Vaquero, Álvaro
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:The purpose of this paper is to reject the thesis that a system of precedent is established with a prescriptive norm. This claim is supported by two lines of reasoning. First, it is claimed that systems of precedent necessarily require constitutive norms and not prescriptive norms. Second, any system of precedent comprises at least two, if not three, constitutive rules of precedent. While one confers the power to set a precedent, another conditions the validity of a judicial decision to the fact that it follows the precedent. Finally, there may also be a third rule that confers the power to ensure that precedent is followed and to annul divergent decisions. Konstitutivna pravila o precedensu: Nepreskriptivistični pogled na stare decisis. Namen prispevka je zavrniti tezo, da je precedenčni sistem vzpostavljen s preskriptivno normo. Avtor svojo trditev podkrepi z dvema vrstama razlogovanja. Prvič, trdi, da precedenčni sistemi nujno zahtevajo konstitutivne norme in ne preskriptivnih norm. Drugič, vsak precedenčni sistem obsega vsaj dve, če ne celo tri, konstitutivna pravila o precedensu. Eno daje pooblastilo za ustvarjanje precedensa, drugo pa pogojuje veljavnost sodne odločbe z dejstvom, da sledi precedensu. Nazadnje lahko obstaja tudi tretje pravilo, ki daje pooblastilo za zagotovitev upoštevanja precedensa in za razveljavitev drugačnih odločitev.
ISSN:1581-7652
1855-7112
DOI:10.4000/revus.8560