Secure transmission in satellite-UAV integrated system against eavesdropping and jamming: A two-level stackelberg game model
Aiming at the physical layer security (PLS) secure transmission existing in the information backhaul link of the satellite-UAV integrated (SUI) network, a two-layer Stackelberg game model (TSGM) that can resist full-duplex (FD) eavesdropping and jamming attacks is proposed. The confrontation relatio...
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Veröffentlicht in: | China communications 2022-07, Vol.19 (7), p.53-66 |
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Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Aiming at the physical layer security (PLS) secure transmission existing in the information backhaul link of the satellite-UAV integrated (SUI) network, a two-layer Stackelberg game model (TSGM) that can resist full-duplex (FD) eavesdropping and jamming attacks is proposed. The confrontation relationship between the UAV network and the attacker is established as the first layer Stackelberg game. The source UAV adjusts its own transmission power strategy according to the attacker's jamming strategy to resist malicious jamming attacks. The internal competition and cooperation relationship in UAV network is modeled as the second layer Stackelberg game, and the optimal cooperative UAV transmits jamming signal to the attacker to resist malicious eavesdropping attacks. Aiming at the "selfishness" of UAV nodes, a price incentive mechanism is established to encourage UAV to actively participate in cooperation, so as to maximize the advantages of cooperative communication. For the proposed TSGM, we construct the utility function and analyze the closed equilibrium solution of the game model, and design a three-stage optimal response iterative (TORI) algorithm to solve the game equilibrium. The simulation results show that the proposed TSGM can effectively increase the utility of the source UAV and improve the enthusiasm of cooperation compared with other power control models. |
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ISSN: | 1673-5447 |
DOI: | 10.23919/JCC.2022.07.005 |