COMPULSION, SECRECY, AND PAPER

In this article, we argue that anyone who accepts that (1) voting should be compulsory, (2) voting should be secret, and (3) voting should be done by paper ballot ends up with a morally problematic position. In electoral systems where compulsory voting is implemented and the secret paper ballot is i...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Public affairs quarterly 2020-07, Vol.34 (3), p.229-244
Hauptverfasser: Thaysen, Jens Damgaard, Uhrenfeldt, Rasmus, Sønderholm, Jørn
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In this article, we argue that anyone who accepts that (1) voting should be compulsory, (2) voting should be secret, and (3) voting should be done by paper ballot ends up with a morally problematic position. In electoral systems where compulsory voting is implemented and the secret paper ballot is in place, it is impossible for officials to check if an elector has cast a valid vote. Therefore, only those who fail to show up at the polls are penalized under the law of compulsory voting. Those electors who show up at the polls but do not vote are not penalized. We argue that this practice amounts to officially sanctioned unequal enforcement of a law, and that such a practice is morally problematic. We then argue that this problem should be solved by rejecting compulsory voting in favor of true mandatory attendance, that is, a regime where the law on the books requires only showing up at the polls on election day as opposed to formally requiring that electors actually cast a valid vote. This is so since only mandatory attendance can be enforced without infringing on the secret ballot, and the law on the books ought to reflect what is actually enforced in practice.
ISSN:0887-0373
2152-0542
DOI:10.2307/26929783