A Note on Second Order Probabilities in the Traditional Deterrence Game

This note focuses on a methodological issue that arises naturally in applications of the traditional deterrence game played under two-sided incomplete information. The problem has potentially interesting implications for the status of the conclusions we draw from various applications of the traditio...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Peace economics, peace science and public policy peace science and public policy, 2010-01, Vol.15 (1), p.1-10
Hauptverfasser:	Carlson, Lisa J, Dacey, Raymond
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	deterrence game second order probabilities
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	This note focuses on a methodological issue that arises naturally in applications of the traditional deterrence game played under two-sided incomplete information. The problem has potentially interesting implications for the status of the conclusions we draw from various applications of the traditional deterrence game.
ISSN:	1554-8597 1554-8597
DOI:	10.2202/1554-8597.1179