A Deception Mechanism against Compromised Station Attacks in IEEE 802.11 Channel-Hopping Systems

We propose a deception mechanism to combat a compromised station in IEEE 802.11 channel hopping systems. A compromised station can follow the hopping channels and continuously attack them, since it recognizes the channel-hopping sequence. The key concept of the deception mechanism is that an access...

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Veröffentlicht in:IEICE Transactions on Communications 2012/10/01, Vol.E95.B(10), pp.3362-3364
Hauptverfasser: JEUNG, Jaemin, JEONG, Seungmyeong, LIM, JaeSung
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:We propose a deception mechanism to combat a compromised station in IEEE 802.11 channel hopping systems. A compromised station can follow the hopping channels and continuously attack them, since it recognizes the channel-hopping sequence. The key concept of the deception mechanism is that an access point notifies a new hopping seed but not to the jammer, while a deception station deceives the jammer. Simulations show that the proposed scheme increases network throughput compared to conventional channel hopping schemes when they are under compromised station attacks.
ISSN:0916-8516
1745-1345
DOI:10.1587/transcom.E95.B.3362