Methodischer Mechanismus und instrumentelle Vernunft: Warum Lebewesen keine Organismen sind
Mechanistic explanations – especially mechanistic models – are commonly used to describe living beings. But their usage should be scrutinised closely. This text elucidates the motives, conditions and implications of a so called ‘methodical mechanism’. Due to the fact that humans cannot properly expl...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 2020-12, Vol.68 (5), p.734-749 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | Mechanistic explanations – especially mechanistic models – are commonly used to describe living beings. But their usage should be scrutinised closely. This text elucidates the motives, conditions and implications of a so called ‘methodical mechanism’. Due to the fact that humans cannot properly explain certain biotic processes, they have to rely on their technical knowledge to explain them. The history of philosophy and scientific thinking is, therefore, intertwined with the history of technology: the way humans interpret and explain natural phenomena is subject to the technological knowledge of a given time. The danger of this mechanistic approach, however, is that it can lead to false ontological assumptions about nature and humankind’s place therein, resulting in a subjugation of natural processes to instrumental reason. |
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ISSN: | 0012-1045 2192-1482 |
DOI: | 10.1515/dzph-2020-0050 |