Vier Modelle des Menschseins

The conflict over the classic problem of philosophical anthropology, i. e., what man actually is, is not only a conflict about what – – determines something to be human. It also requires clarification of the manner in which something is determined to be human by the in question. There being different options for the latter, the classic anthropological conflict concerns not only definitions of being human, but also models of being human. The present paper investigates four such models: the addition model, the interior model, the privation model, and the transformation model. While the first will serve as a baseline for comparison, the three other models will, in order to escape the danger of making too formal an argument, be discussed exemplarily, i. e. by focusing in each case on a certain proponent of the respective model. Those proponents will be Martin Heidegger for the interior model, Arnold Gehlen for the privation model, and Helmuth Plessner for the transformation model.