Sourcing from a Self-Reporting Supplier: Strategic Communication of Social Responsibility in a Supply Chain

Problem definition : To manage supplier social responsibility (SR), some firms have adopted a self-assessment strategy whereby they ask suppliers to self-report SR capabilities. Self-reported information is difficult to verify, and this leads to an important credibility question: can a buyer expect...

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Veröffentlicht in:Manufacturing & service operations management 2022-03, Vol.24 (2), p.902-920
1. Verfasser: Lu, Tao
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Problem definition : To manage supplier social responsibility (SR), some firms have adopted a self-assessment strategy whereby they ask suppliers to self-report SR capabilities. Self-reported information is difficult to verify, and this leads to an important credibility question: can a buyer expect truthful reporting? We examine whether a supplier’s SR capability can be credibly communicated through free and unverifiable self-reporting. Academic/practical relevance : SR is a strategic focus for firms because consumers care about ethical production. Some firms rely on supplier self-assessment as part of their SR strategy. It is important to understand the value and challenges of this approach. Methodology : We develop a cheap talk model of a supplier and a buyer. The supplier is endowed with a given SR level (privately known to the supplier) that represents the probability of no violation. The buyer sells in a market that is sensitive to publicized SR violations. The supplier first communicates its SR level to the buyer, and then the buyer chooses between two audit stringency levels to conduct on the supplier and also chooses how much to order. Results : Influential truthful communication may emerge in equilibrium if (i) the buyer orders a larger quantity from the high-type supplier but imposes a more stringent audit than the buyer would for the low type and (ii) the high-type supplier opts for this larger order, whereas the low-type, fearing audit failure, does not. The buyer can benefit as the audit becomes more expensive. Managerial implications : Supplier SR self-assessments can be a valuable strategy for buyers but only if the buyer has access to auditing capabilities of different levels and does not precommit to a particular level. It is valuable for firms to engage in an up-front auditing step to ensure a minimum SR capability of approved suppliers because very low-performing suppliers never truthfully report. Implementing supplier self-assessments may or may not help reduce the social damage resulting from potential SR violations; we identify situations when it helps and when it does not.
ISSN:1523-4614
1526-5498
DOI:10.1287/msom.2021.0978