Misrepresenting Methodology: A Critique of Epistemological Engineering in Social Science Research

Among the most pervasive issues currently debated in the social sciences pertains to scientific misconduct. The discourse on scientific misconduct has burgeoned in the last three decades and has come to permeate multiple arenas, including academia, industry, and public policy. While interest in this area has imparted critical insights into understanding and regulating the phenomenon, some commentators have argued that it is time to expand the scope of what acts precisely qualify as scientific misconduct—beyond its conventional definition that conflates the term with fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism. In responding to this line of critique, this article focuses on a neglected aspect of scientific misconduct, though one which is particularly prevalent in social science research—namely, the case of researchers offering disingenuous claims related to a study's methodology. To explicate how this form of misconduct in science materializes into action, this article revisits Bruno Latour's careful tracing of scientists in laboratories. Through his analysis, Latour captures the disjuncture in the rhetoric and the practice of methodology in empirical research. Integrating Latour's critique with the concept of agential realism, we present one philosophically grounded avenue by which to resolve this form of scientific misconduct in future social science research.