Getting the Price Right? The Impact of Competitive Bidding in the Medicare Program

We study Medicare's competitive bidding program (CBP) for durable medical equipment (DME). We use Medicare claims data to examine the effect on prices and utilization, focusing on continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) devices for sleep apnea. We find that spending falls by 47.2% percent af...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:The review of economics and statistics 2022-09, p.1-45
Hauptverfasser: Ding, Hui, Duggan, Mark, Starc, Amanda
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:We study Medicare's competitive bidding program (CBP) for durable medical equipment (DME). We use Medicare claims data to examine the effect on prices and utilization, focusing on continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) devices for sleep apnea. We find that spending falls by 47.2% percent after a highly imperfect bidding mechanism is introduced. This is almost entirely driven by a 44.8% price reduction, though quantities also fall by 4.3%. To disentangle supply and demand, we leverage differential cost sharing across Medicare recipients. We measure a demand elasticity of -0.272 and find that quantity reductions are concentrated among less clinically appropriate groups.
ISSN:0034-6535
1530-9142
DOI:10.1162/rest_a_01249