The B razilian pension model: The pending agenda

To achieve national goals defined by the 1988 B razilian Federal C onstitution, cash benefits alone are insufficient in the absence of more robust social services to reduce inequalities and improve social cohesion. The C onstitution, albeit of national importance and international significance, has not addressed many institutional and administrative weaknesses in the design of the national pension system. Although coverage has been increased and inequality reduced, these measures are not sufficient. B razil's ambitions to further develop social policies (and, indeed, to live up to its accorded international status as a social policy leader) may be constrained by an over‐reliance on conditional cash transfers such as those provided under the Bolsa Família programme. B razil faces a major political‐economy challenge in addressing all these issues because the policy reform process is difficult, and, more importantly, because of the embedded role of vested interests. Moreover, B razil must tackle these issues in the face of growing fiscal pressures, which could weaken the current political legitimacy of social policy and undermine important recent successes.