Dynamical Failures Driven by False Load Injection Attacks Against Smart Grid

Extensive studies have revealed that smart grid is vulnerable to cyber-physical attacks. However, these strategies only focus on the cascading initiation phase to induce single-stage failures with multiple branch tripping, lacking of exploring the attack effectiveness in the propagation phase so tha...

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Veröffentlicht in:IEEE transactions on information forensics and security 2022, Vol.17, p.2213-2226
Hauptverfasser: Peng, Da-Tian, Dong, Jianmin, Yang, Jungang, Peng, Qinke
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Extensive studies have revealed that smart grid is vulnerable to cyber-physical attacks. However, these strategies only focus on the cascading initiation phase to induce single-stage failures with multiple branch tripping, lacking of exploring the attack effectiveness in the propagation phase so that the deeply-hidden cascading failures are underestimated. In this paper, we propose a novel false load injection attack strategy that can intentionally penetrate into the cascading propagation phase to drive multi-stage dynamical failures with a cascading process. Specifically, we formulate a bi-level optimization problem to model the adversarial game between operator and attacker. The former is in charge of security-constrained economic dispatching to minimize the generation cost, and the latter aims to maximize the cumulative number of tripped branches. Further, we reformulate this NP-hard bi-level problem as a mixed integer linear program for tractable computation. Finally, we perform numerical simulations on different-scale IEEE test systems to validate our strategy in driving the dynamical failures.
ISSN:1556-6013
1556-6021
DOI:10.1109/TIFS.2022.3181860