The Evolutionary Game of Electronic Seal Usage Behaviour Supervision From the Perspective of Credit and Penalty

The illegal use of electronic seals has the potential to harm both the contracting parties and the country's economy. This paper studies the phylogenetic relationship between government regulatory bodies and enterprise behaviors through the payoff matrix and an evolutionary game model. Accordin...

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Veröffentlicht in:IEEE access 2018, Vol.6, p.57751-57762
Hauptverfasser: Liang, Hejun, Yuan, Guanghui, Yang, Yunpeng, Yang, Jianzheng, Fan, Chongjun
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Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:The illegal use of electronic seals has the potential to harm both the contracting parties and the country's economy. This paper studies the phylogenetic relationship between government regulatory bodies and enterprise behaviors through the payoff matrix and an evolutionary game model. According to both the equilibrium point and stability of the game's dynamic replication relationship phase diagram, this paper analyzes the incentive effects of the legal use of management costs and the illegal use of economic penalties, government regulatory costs, and credit ratings on the use of electronic seals. The results show that the steady state does not exist as a time extension of government supervision and standardize the behaviors of electronic seal enterprises. In addition, the selection specification evolutionary path using electronic seals is different based on the different initial conditions. The use of the restricted speed and the evolutionary result not only depends on the choice of the enterprise's standard initial probability of usage behavior but also on the initial probability of government departmental supervision. This occurs without using any means of supervision and penalty measures under the conditions that all enterprises tend to choose not to regulate the use of the electronic seal. Due to regulation with a low probability of no significant effect of the standard, the need to reach a certain level of supervision to regulate the use of electronic seals was improved. The government simply increasing the penalty is not an effective solution since the electronic seal does not regulate the problematic use of credit rating factors. On the one hand, it reduces the probability of government regulations, and on the other hand, it greatly improves the standard probability of the use of electronic seals. Finally, conclusions are based on the governmental point of view to promote the use of electronic seal specification recommendations.
ISSN:2169-3536
2169-3536
DOI:10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2872322