An empirical evaluation of the impact of agency conflicts on the association between corporate governance and firm financial performance

PurposeThe study aims to predict and understand the conditions under which the association between corporate governance and a company's financial performance is positive or meaningful by empirically accounting for agency conflicts. This study is motivated by the fact that the separation between ownership and control creates agency conflicts between company owners and managers. Therefore, strong corporate governance systems are expected to align the interests of conflicting parties whereby companies become more likely to improve their financial performance. However, previous research did not yield consistent results in this regard.Design/methodology/approachGiven the latent nature of corporate governance and agency conflicts, this study uses principal component and exploratory factor analyses to proxy for corporate governance and agency conflicts, respectively. Using dynamic panel data modelling, the authors estimate the change in the relationship between corporate governance and a company's financial performance as a function of the change in the level of agency conflict using data from the UK on 78 non-financial companies listed in the Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 (FTSE100) index between 1999 and 2014.FindingsThe corporate governance quality of companies is significantly differed. Moreover, companies operating at high levels of agency conflict outperform the companies' counterparts operating in low levels of agency conflict only when the former improves the corporate governance quality. This implies that financial performance improves by approximately 11% if companies improve corporate governance quality due to an increase in the level of agency conflicts.Research limitations/implicationsLack of data on ownership structure for the study period (1999–2014) was the main reason the authors excluded it from the analysis. Additionally, the lack of reliable and quantifiable corporate governance data on small-medium sized enterprises limits findings on large non-financial companies.Practical implicationsThe authors propose a framework/tool for the impact of the level of corporate governance compliance on financial performance conditional upon the level of agency conflicts whose importance has largely been neglected by the empirical literature. By providing the right “lens” to de-fragmentise the corporate governance mechanisms and estimate empirically the unobserved agency conflicts, researchers, practitioners and investors are able to get further insights