Effects of founder CEO duality and board size on foreign IPOs’ survival in US markets

Purpose This study aims to investigate how three critical governance decisions by foreign firms impacted their survivability post-initial public offerings (IPO): the choice of CEO (founder vs non-founder); the power the founder CEO wields relative to the board in terms of CEO duality; and board size. Design/methodology/approach This study uses data from 86 foreign firms that completed IPOs in the US market between 2000 and 2008 and adopts a Cox proportional hazards model to examine how the founder, founder CEO duality and board size influence foreign firm delisting post-IPO. Findings A founder CEO or a founder CEO with duality (i.e. when a founder CEO is also chair of the board of directors) does not support a foreign firm’s survival post-IPO. Expectedly, board size has a negative impact on post-IPO firm survivability; however, founder CEO duality positively moderates this negative relationship. Therefore, founder CEO duality plays a positive indirect role in the context of post-IPO firms with large boards. Originality/value First, while the benefits of CEO duality have been empirically ambiguous, this study clarifies how founder CEO duality manifests its positive impacts in foreign listings. Second, by focusing on board cognition, this study confirms the negative impact of large boards, but highlights that this can be mitigated by governance leadership structure. Finally, despite organizational life-cycle theorists’ advocacy of the replacement of founder CEOs with professional CEOs in sizable ventures, this study shows the benefits of their retention when the board is large.