ASEAN, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the politics of pragmatism

The article argues that ASEAN's timid response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine merits scholarly attention. The responses from ASEAN member countries represent a path-dependent tradition of foreign policy pragmatism, which seeks to avoid entanglement in great power politics. Abstract The timid response of member governments of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has puzzled many western observers as it flagrantly violates the most basic norms of international law to which ASEAN expressly subscribes. This article seeks to provide answers to this puzzle. Informed by practice theory, the article transcends conventional realist explanations of how small and medium-sized countries respond to great power politics. Combining material and cognitive arguments, practice theory allows identifying the cultural and ideational roots of these policies and uncovering mismatches between rhetoric and agency. It suggests that, conceptualized as communities of practice, ASEAN member countries' foreign policy elites have developed a path-dependent pragmatism, which guides their response to great power politics and hence the war in Ukraine. Employing a qualitative mixed-methods approach, the empirical part of the article examines how south-east Asia's diplomatic communities of practice define pragmatism and shows that, historically, pragmatism has strongly guided their foreign policies. It traces ASEAN governments' pragmatic responses to the war in Ukraine at three levels: the national, regional and the (global) multilateral level. The article concludes that liberal proselytism does not help the West to win over ASEAN member countries to support its pro-Ukraine course.