Desperation on the Battlefield, the Ethnic Security Dilemma, or Economic Competition? Mass Shootings in Chicago’s Gang Wars, 2010–20

Abstract In this study examine the logic of gang-related mass shootings in Chicago between 2010 and 2020. I argue that gangs utilize mass shootings to win market share when demand for illegal drugs spikes. I also test two established theories of indiscriminate violence: ‘desperation on the battlefield’ and the ‘ethnic security dilemma’. To do so I construct an original dataset mainly using Freedom of Information Act responses. Using opioid overdose data to proxy for demand in drug markets, I find support for my theory in a series of linear fixed effects models. The ‘ethnic security dilemma’ also finds support. However, the two variables meant to proxy for ‘desperation’, search warrants and arrests of gang members for shootings, reduce gang-related mass shootings—the opposite of the predicted outcome. I conclude by discussing contributions to the existing literature, limitations and pathways for future research.