Is Protestant Interpretation an Acceptable Attitude Toward Normative Social Practices? An Analysis of Dworkin and Postema
Gerald Postema raised a powerful challenge to Ronald Dworkin’s theory of interpretation. By allowing each interpreter to make her own judgment about the content of a social norm, Dworkinian interpretation becomes insufficiently intersubjective and insufficiently political. In previous work, I argued...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The American journal of jurisprudence (Notre Dame) 2021-10, Vol.66 (1), p.1-25 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | Gerald Postema raised a powerful challenge to Ronald Dworkin’s theory of interpretation. By allowing each interpreter to make her own judgment about the content of a social norm, Dworkinian interpretation becomes insufficiently intersubjective and insufficiently political. In previous work, I argued that this criticism must be rejected because Postema’s own account of law, analogical reasoning, and the rule of law requires one to make a reflected judgment and hold other actors accountable to the law. Nevertheless, a powerful objection claims that protestant interpretation is incompatible with the first person-plural reasoning that an intersubjective social practice requires. In response to the objection, I argue that no such incompatibility exists. On closer examination, protestant interpretation is part of the attitude that a rational agent must adopt if she is to acquit her moral responsibilities as a participant in a social practice. |
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ISSN: | 0065-8995 2049-6494 |
DOI: | 10.1093/ajj/auab004 |