Against Kantian Statism

Kantian statists believe that the state is a conceptual prerequisite for the acquisition of property rights and, hence, of freedom itself. They argue that under statelessness, property rights are indeterminate, unilateral, and unassured and therefore remain merely provisional until a state is instituted. We are not morally bound by merely provisional rights, and hence there can be no justice (or injustice) without a state. This article makes two arguments. First, it argues that property rights need not be conceptually indeterminate under statelessness. Social conventions that fall short of a state can give determinacy in ways that Kantians have not adequately considered. Second, it argues that the problems of unilateralism and nonassurance are parasitical on the problem of indeterminacy. Therefore, overcoming indeterminacy overcomes the overall thesis. I argue, therefore, that the state is not conceptually necessary to our freedom, and we have no unconditional natural duty to institute and obey a state.