On the Degree of Confidence for Adverse Decisions

In a criminal trial, the prosecution needs to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. When an individual is accused of wrongdoing outside the criminal process, as when teachers and politicians are charged with sexual harassment and employees are charged with financial improprieties, people often a...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of legal studies 1996-01, Vol.25 (1), p.27-52
Hauptverfasser: Schauer, Frederick, Zeckhauser, Richard
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description In a criminal trial, the prosecution needs to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. When an individual is accused of wrongdoing outside the criminal process, as when teachers and politicians are charged with sexual harassment and employees are charged with financial improprieties, people often assume that a similarly stringent standard of proof applies. Yet this transfer from criminal law model to other settings is mistaken. When the value of freedom from incarceration is absent, and other values are present, probabilities of "guilt" less than "beyond a reasonable doubt," perhaps only a mere possibility, are often socially, statistically, and morally legitimate bases for adverse decisions. Relatedly, although sound reasons for the criminal law's refusal to cumulate multiple low-probability accusations exist, the reasons for such refusal are often inapt in other settings. Taking adverse decisions based on cumulating multiple low-probability charges is often justifiable both morally and mathematically.
doi_str_mv 10.1086/467970
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source Jstor Complete Legacy; HeinOnline Law Journal Library
subjects Beyond a reasonable doubt
Burden of proof
Burden of proof standards
Criminal law
Criminals
Defendants
Guilt
Guilty verdicts
Prior convictions
Sexual harassment
title On the Degree of Confidence for Adverse Decisions
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