On the Degree of Confidence for Adverse Decisions

In a criminal trial, the prosecution needs to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. When an individual is accused of wrongdoing outside the criminal process, as when teachers and politicians are charged with sexual harassment and employees are charged with financial improprieties, people often a...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of legal studies 1996-01, Vol.25 (1), p.27-52
Hauptverfasser: Schauer, Frederick, Zeckhauser, Richard
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In a criminal trial, the prosecution needs to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. When an individual is accused of wrongdoing outside the criminal process, as when teachers and politicians are charged with sexual harassment and employees are charged with financial improprieties, people often assume that a similarly stringent standard of proof applies. Yet this transfer from criminal law model to other settings is mistaken. When the value of freedom from incarceration is absent, and other values are present, probabilities of "guilt" less than "beyond a reasonable doubt," perhaps only a mere possibility, are often socially, statistically, and morally legitimate bases for adverse decisions. Relatedly, although sound reasons for the criminal law's refusal to cumulate multiple low-probability accusations exist, the reasons for such refusal are often inapt in other settings. Taking adverse decisions based on cumulating multiple low-probability charges is often justifiable both morally and mathematically.
ISSN:0047-2530
1537-5366
DOI:10.1086/467970