The European Community as Monetarist Construction: A Critique of Moravcsik

A critique of Andrew Moravcsik's The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (1998) acknowledges the fundamental validity of Moravcsik's basic three-stage model, but identifies omitted geopolitical, institutional, ideological, & class dimensions, & offers a more balanced explanation of the initial negotiations of the European Community (EC) & the treaties of Rome & Maastricht. Moravcsik's model is explained, noting producers represented by peak associations determine their interest preferences in pursuit of export opportunities first amassed & evaluated by national governments, then negotiated with others to realize mutually beneficial arrangements. It is contended that his method neither furnishes justification for the selection/ordering of facts nor describes actual decision making. A detailed analysis of the Rome & Maastricht treaties indicates that Moravcsik fails to incorporate industrial & monetary asymmetries in his bargaining theory. Although powerful, the study also ignores the unintended constraints resulting from EC institutions, laws, & policies. It is maintained that the missing dimensions were crucial in determining the chosen Europe. J. Lindroth