Information and access to United Nations diplomatic missions

United Nations (UN) diplomats play an important role in international policy, yet there is a scarcity of evidence and theory on their preferences and behaviour. We report the results of an online field experiment designed to identify the revealed preferences of diplomats. In particular, we investiga...

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Veröffentlicht in:Applied economics letters 2017-05, Vol.24 (9), p.594-597
Hauptverfasser: Aronow, Peter M., Offer-Westort, Molly, Pinson, Lauren E., Perez-Gea, Ana C.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:United Nations (UN) diplomats play an important role in international policy, yet there is a scarcity of evidence and theory on their preferences and behaviour. We report the results of an online field experiment designed to identify the revealed preferences of diplomats. In particular, we investigate whether and how diplomats will provide access to outside organizations based on offers of information. We contacted diplomats by email and randomized offers of information on either peer missions or world affairs. While offers of information on peers garnered nearly 45% more responses indicating interest than offers of information on world affairs, response rates across both treatments were low, and the difference is only 3.3 percentage points. Our estimated treatment effects of assignment to the peer as compared to world affairs treatment are not statistically significant. Our experiment failed to provide evidence that these types of informational offers facilitate differential access to UN diplomats.
ISSN:1350-4851
1466-4291
DOI:10.1080/13504851.2016.1213359