All-pay auctions with discrete action spaces
This article describes all-pay auctions with discrete action spaces and shows that pure-strategy Nash equilibria may exist. Such equilibria are shown to be potentially more favourable to both buyers and sellers than the more standard mixed-strategy equilibria, thus suggesting that it can be in the i...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Applied economics letters 2011-02, Vol.18 (2), p.161-162 |
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| container_end_page | 162 |
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| container_title | Applied economics letters |
| container_volume | 18 |
| creator | Boudreau, James W. |
| description | This article describes all-pay auctions with discrete action spaces and shows that pure-strategy Nash equilibria may exist. Such equilibria are shown to be potentially more favourable to both buyers and sellers than the more standard mixed-strategy equilibria, thus suggesting that it can be in the interest of both sides to limit bidders' action spaces. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1080/13504850903442954 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1350-4851 |
| ispartof | Applied economics letters, 2011-02, Vol.18 (2), p.161-162 |
| issn | 1350-4851 1466-4291 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_crossref_primary_10_1080_13504850903442954 |
| source | RePEc; Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Auctions Bidders Bidding Economic analysis Equilibrium Game theory Nash equilibrium Studies |
| title | All-pay auctions with discrete action spaces |
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