All-pay auctions with discrete action spaces

All-pay auctions with discrete action spaces

This article describes all-pay auctions with discrete action spaces and shows that pure-strategy Nash equilibria may exist. Such equilibria are shown to be potentially more favourable to both buyers and sellers than the more standard mixed-strategy equilibria, thus suggesting that it can be in the i...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Applied economics letters 2011-02, Vol.18 (2), p.161-162
1. Verfasser: Boudreau, James W.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Auctions
Bidders
Bidding
Economic analysis
Equilibrium
Game theory
Nash equilibrium
Studies
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:This article describes all-pay auctions with discrete action spaces and shows that pure-strategy Nash equilibria may exist. Such equilibria are shown to be potentially more favourable to both buyers and sellers than the more standard mixed-strategy equilibria, thus suggesting that it can be in the interest of both sides to limit bidders' action spaces.
ISSN:1350-4851
1466-4291
DOI:10.1080/13504850903442954