Munich, Vietnam, Beirut or Somalia?: Historical analogies in American debates over the 1992–1995 Bosnian war

The aim of this paper is to analyze the role of historical analogies in American debates over military intervention in the Bosnian War. From 1992 to 1995, at least half a dozen analogies were frequently invoked as the US pondered how to react in Bosnia. The clash of analogies reflected the different worldviews of America's decision-makers and opinion leaders. Of these, four came to dominate the debate over Bosnia. While advocates of an assertive action in Bosnia invoked "Munich," opponents pointed to the potential scenario of a Vietnam-like quagmire in the Balkans. As in many other cases involving the American use of force abroad, "Munich" and "Vietnam" stood as conflicting prisms shaping the debate over Bosnia. But, overlooked and understudied has been the impact of "Beirut" and "Somalia" on American decision-makers and opinion leaders. The terrorist attack on US Marines in 1983 and the deaths of American servicemen in Mogadishu in 1993 dampened support for a military intervention in Bosnia. As events in post-war Bosnia were to prove, the decision to deploy US troops to implement the Dayton Peace Accords did not lead to a "Vietnam," "Beirut" or "Somalia." In fact, the US-led peacekeeping force was crucial for establishing and maintaining peace.