America’s “China-First” grand strategy and the transatlantic bargain: revisiting the security–economics nexus

Since Washington announced its “rebalance to Asia” in 2011, debates about America’s Europe strategy have centered on whether America’s European allies could defend themselves without the USA. This debate has overlooked a crucial point: Washington’s security commitment to Europe is not only about military power but also hinges on European acquiescence to Washington’s politico-economic leadership position. US policymakers today increasingly view China as the main challenge to the latter. Accordingly, this article’s driving hypothesis is that the more significance the USA assigns to its European allies in the context of its China agenda, the more it will, for better or worse, seek to maintain (some degree of) European security dependence on the USA. Case studies of the Europe strategies of the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations, respectively, serve as a vehicle to probe the plausibility of this argument.