On Internal Structure, Categorical Structure, and Representation

If categorical equivalence is a good criterion of theoretical equivalence, then it would seem that if some class of mathematical structures is represented as a category, then any other class of structures categorically equivalent to it will have the same representational capacities. Hudetz (2019a) h...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Philosophy of science 2023-01, Vol.90 (1), p.188-195
1. Verfasser:	Dewar, Neil
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Sprache:	eng
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description	If categorical equivalence is a good criterion of theoretical equivalence, then it would seem that if some class of mathematical structures is represented as a category, then any other class of structures categorically equivalent to it will have the same representational capacities. Hudetz (2019a) has presented an apparent counterexample to this claim; in this note, I argue that the counterexample fails.
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title	On Internal Structure, Categorical Structure, and Representation
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