Electricity market equilibria analysis on the value of demand-side flexibility portfolios’ mix and the strategic demand aggregators’ market power

Electricity market equilibrium analysis is becoming increasingly important within the today’s liberalized electricity market and regulatory context for both market participants and policy makers. The former ones want to make informed business decisions to optimize their market position, while the la...

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Veröffentlicht in:Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks Grids and Networks, 2024-06, Vol.38, p.101399, Article 101399
Hauptverfasser: Khaksari, Alireza, Steriotis, Konstantinos, Makris, Prodromos, Tsaousoglou, Georgios, Efthymiopoulos, Nikolaos, Varvarigos, Emmanouel
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Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Electricity market equilibrium analysis is becoming increasingly important within the today’s liberalized electricity market and regulatory context for both market participants and policy makers. The former ones want to make informed business decisions to optimize their market position, while the latter need to promote efficient equilibria that satisfy both supply and demand-side requirements and optimize social welfare. In this paper, we focus on modeling the strategic demand aggregators’ (DA) behavior via an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) formulation. We model typical demand flexibility portfolios that comprise of several types of distributed flexibility assets and renewable energy resources. We then quantify the value of demand flexibility portfolios’ mix and respective value of market power that a strategic DA may exercise with respect to each DA’s cost decrease and social welfare as a function of time for a day-ahead market use case. Simulation results show that: (i) there is an optimal equilibrium point where overall DAs’ costs decrease, while social welfare’s deteriorates negligibly, (ii) there may be a trade-off between the rate of a certain DA’s cost decrease and the rate of market power (or else % share of total demand flexibility) that this DA possesses, so the strategic DA should take this into account in order to find its optimal CAPEX/OPEX balance for its portfolio, (iii) competition among strategic DAs at the demand-side can mitigate grid congestion problems and serve as a counter-balance to the strategic behavior of the supply-side market participants.
ISSN:2352-4677
2352-4677
DOI:10.1016/j.segan.2024.101399