Do stock swap bidders suspend their stock trading? Evidence from China

Chinese firms can suspend trading of their stocks when they announce major events. We find that stock-swap acquirers tend to suspend stock trading after a significant stock price run-up. Suspending bidders also show significantly high announcement returns if the bidder pays with stocks, while the re...

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Veröffentlicht in:Pacific-Basin finance journal 2024-06, Vol.85, p.1-19, Article 102331
Hauptverfasser: Qi, Qingyu, Uchida, Konari, Liu, Jianlei
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Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Chinese firms can suspend trading of their stocks when they announce major events. We find that stock-swap acquirers tend to suspend stock trading after a significant stock price run-up. Suspending bidders also show significantly high announcement returns if the bidder pays with stocks, while the returns are negatively associated with the pre-suspension run-up. However, the positive return disappears in the long run. These results suggest stock-swap bidders take advantage of stock trading suspension when they identify overvaluation, providing direct evidence that stock-financed acquirers have an incentive to manage stock prices. The results are robust to firms' corporate governance structures. •Chinese firms can suspend trading of their stocks.•Stock-swap acquirers suspend stock trading after a stock price run-up.•Stock-swap acquisitions receive better announcement returns than cash only deals.•Chinese stock-swap acquirers strategically suspend stock trading.•Announcement returns are negatively related to the stock price run-up.
ISSN:0927-538X
DOI:10.1016/j.pacfin.2024.102331