News credibility and the quest for clicks

We examine a model of dynamic communication by a media outlet. In each period, the uninformed public can consult the outlet’s report at a cost. The outlet, which is primarily driven by profit maximization, has an incentive to induce uncertainty in order to encourage future consultation and thereby generate revenue. In an intermediate cost range, the public and the outlet may be worse off with a cheaper cost of access since it leads the outlet to distort information more, by making the public’s future consultation decision more responsive to the current report. •We theoretically study reporting by a media firm that earns revenue from clicks.•Decrease in cost of access makes consumers’ decision to click/visit more manipulable.•The media firm tries to induce future visits, which makes its reports less credible.•Both the media firm and consumers may be worse off with a lower cost of access.•Competition between media firms may not increase the credibility of thier reports.