Robust α-maxmin representations
The class of α-maxmin representations of an agent’s preferences is meant to achieve a separation between the ambiguity he perceives and his attitude toward this perceived ambiguity. Yet the same preferences may admit a multiplicity of α-maxmin representations that contradict each other. We say that...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of mathematical economics 2024-10, Vol.114, p.1-10, Article 103045 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | The class of α-maxmin representations of an agent’s preferences is meant to achieve a separation between the ambiguity he perceives and his attitude toward this perceived ambiguity. Yet the same preferences may admit a multiplicity of α-maxmin representations that contradict each other. We say that an α-maxmin representation is robust when no other α-maxmin representation exists for the same preferences. We obtain a full characterization of robustness for maxmin representation. In the case of general α-maxmin representations, we obtain sufficient conditions for both robustness and non-robustness. This contributes to better identification of the α-maxmin representations that admit a robust interpretation in terms of perceived ambiguity and ambiguity attitudes. |
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ISSN: | 0304-4068 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103045 |