Regulatory arbitrage or random errors? Implications of race prediction algorithms in fair lending analysis

When race is not directly observed, regulators and analysts commonly predict it using algorithms based on last name and address. In small business lending—where regulators assess fair lending law compliance using the Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding (BISG) algorithm—we document large prediction e...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of financial economics 2024-07, Vol.157, p.1-23, Article 103857
Hauptverfasser: Greenwald, Daniel L., Howell, Sabrina T., Li, Cangyuan, Yimfor, Emmanuel
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:When race is not directly observed, regulators and analysts commonly predict it using algorithms based on last name and address. In small business lending—where regulators assess fair lending law compliance using the Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding (BISG) algorithm—we document large prediction errors among Black Americans. The errors bias measured racial disparities in loan approval rates downward by 43%, with greater bias for traditional vs. fintech lenders. Regulation using self-identified race would increase lending to Black borrowers, but also shift lending toward affluent areas because errors correlate with socioeconomics. Overall, using race proxies in policymaking and research presents challenges.
ISSN:0304-405X
1879-2774
DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103857