CSR investment decision and coordination strategy for closed-loop supply chain with two competing retailers

Due to the influence of external factors such as government regulations, public concern and media reports, some enterprises will show their contribution to the society and environment by performing corporate social responsibility (CSR) so as to establish a good corporate image and enhance market competitiveness. According to this, we believe that it is of theoretical and practical significance to explore the recovery and pricing decision of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with CSR investment. This paper investigates the decision and coordination problems for a CLSC considering CSR investment with two competing retailers. Based on three modes: 1) without CSR investment, 2) only one retailer considers CSR investment, 3) both the two competing retailers consider CSR investment, the pricing decision models of CLSC under centralized and decentralized decision-making are constructed respectively. The research shows that the retailers with CSR investment behaviour gain more profits than that without CSR investment. From the perspective of improving the overall performance of CLSC, the operation mode with both two competing retailers consider CSR investment is the best, while the operation mode that without CSR investment is the worst. For the decentralized CLSC with two competing retailers considering CSR investment simultaneously, a coordination mechanism based on “revenue-cost sharing” is established, which can effectively realize the coordination of CLSC system within the scope of contract parameters that all member enterprises are willing to accept.