Political corruption and corporate payouts

Firms headquartered in more corrupt US environments (states) provide higher payouts to their shareholders. Our results are robust to, for example propensity score matching, instrumental variable approach, headquarters relocations, quasi natural experiments using exogenous shocks, use of alternative...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Journal of banking & finance 2021-02, Vol.123, p.106016, Article 106016
Hauptverfasser: Hossain, Ashrafee Tanvir, Hossain, Takdir, Kryzanowski, Lawrence
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Firms headquartered in more corrupt US environments (states) provide higher payouts to their shareholders. Our results are robust to, for example propensity score matching, instrumental variable approach, headquarters relocations, quasi natural experiments using exogenous shocks, use of alternative measures of corruption and payouts, use of additional (possibly omitted) variables, and various alternative explanations based on additional channels and moderating factors. Our study finds that the use and marginal value of dividend payout as a shielding channel is affected by state-level corruption. Our study also adds geographic-based shielding as another important motivation for firms to make corporate payouts.
ISSN:0378-4266
1872-6372
DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.106016