Assessment of risk-sharing ratio with considering budget constraint and disruption risk under a triangular Pythagorean fuzzy environment in public–private partnership projects

•Our approach addresses the sharing risk problem between government and investors.•It includes constraints that limit the pollution effects on population centers.•It considers social responsibility, economics factors, and benefits of waste recycling. The public–private partnership (PPP) is a practical and standard model that has been at the center of attention over the past two decades. Sharing risk between government and investors has been a challenging issue over the last year. This study formulates a model that aims to define the investors’ longing and allocate risks to the government in a logical range. Besides, in some real-world conditions, foreign investors with lower cost, higher quality, and better technology than domestic investors partner with the government. Under this condition, it is essential to consider the disruption risks because of sanctions and currency price fluctuations. Furthermore, the limited budget of the government for investing in infrastructure projects is intended. In this paper, the government's disruption risks and limited budget are added to the risk-sharing ratio model for the first time in literature. Moreover, the Pythagorean fuzzy sets (PFSs) are applied to cope with the uncertainty of real-world conditions. The PFSs are more potent than classical and intuitionistic fuzzy sets (IFSs) in dealing with uncertainty. The PFSs provide the membership, non-membership, and hesitancy degree for experts to better address the derived uncertainty of real-world conditions. Also, compared with the IFSs, PFSs prepare more space, consequently providing more freedom to address the uncertainty. Finally, a case study is presented to illustrate the applicability and susceptibility of the suggested model. As disruption risks increase, general utility degree, government utility, and investor’s effort decrease, and the guarantee risk ratio by government increases. Note that, investor’s effort decreases because the government is forced to give the unfinished project to the domestic investor; consequently, exclusive terms arise for the domestic investor.