When does division matter? Revisiting the optimal contest architecture

We compare the aggregate effort between centralized and decentralized contests. Employing a relatively general setting that admits the ratio-form and additive-noise contests as special cases, we identify the population size elasticity of marginal winning probability as a key determinant of this comp...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Economics letters 2023-09, Vol.230, p.111233, Article 111233
1. Verfasser: Yildirim, Mustafa
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:We compare the aggregate effort between centralized and decentralized contests. Employing a relatively general setting that admits the ratio-form and additive-noise contests as special cases, we identify the population size elasticity of marginal winning probability as a key determinant of this comparison. •We compare total effort across centralized and decentralized contests.•The population-elasticity of marginal contest success arises as a key factor.•Convexity of marginal effort cost per marginal contest success also matters.•Decentralized contests elicit greater effort with sufficient luck in performance.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111233