Constrained public goods in weighted networks with heterogeneous agents
This paper generalizes the constrained public goods model of Allouch and King (2019) to weighted networks with heterogeneous agents. We provide an algorithm to distinguish contributors from free-riders in equilibrium. We show that this algorithm always terminates in finite steps and, therefore, Nash...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Economics letters 2022-04, Vol.213, p.110332, Article 110332 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | This paper generalizes the constrained public goods model of Allouch and King (2019) to weighted networks with heterogeneous agents. We provide an algorithm to distinguish contributors from free-riders in equilibrium. We show that this algorithm always terminates in finite steps and, therefore, Nash equilibrium always exists.
•The public good game in weighted networks with heterogeneous agents is studied.•An algorithm is introduced to compute Nash equilibria.•Contributors are in the terminal set from the algorithm.•Nash equilibria always exist since the algorithm terminates in finite steps. |
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ISSN: | 0165-1765 1873-7374 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110332 |