A bargaining experiment under weak property rights, with implications for indigenous title claims
We explore how three parties bargain over a windfall created by a development project given negative spillover on only one party's property. We compare how weak and strong property rights affect negotiation outcomes and fairness. With strong property rights, parties secure equal payment. With w...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Ecological economics 2022-08, Vol.198, p.107457, Article 107457 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , , , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | We explore how three parties bargain over a windfall created by a development project given negative spillover on only one party's property. We compare how weak and strong property rights affect negotiation outcomes and fairness. With strong property rights, parties secure equal payment. With weak rights, parties reimburse costs and divide surplus so the developer is simply indifferent, nothing more. These results are meaningful for Indigenous in Canada: without strong property rights, the Crown's duty to consult may still yield dissatisfaction because of improper compensation. |
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ISSN: | 0921-8009 1873-6106 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2022.107457 |