Design and strategy selection for quality incentive mechanisms in the public cloud manufacturing model

•Cloud Manufacturing is facing challenges of uncontrollable quality caused by ‘random matching’ transactions.•Designed and compared three quality incentive mechanisms for cloud manufacturing platform operators.•Analyzed the necessary conditions for effectively implementing these quality incentive me...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Computers & industrial engineering 2024-12, Vol.198, p.110681, Article 110681
Hauptverfasser: Yuan, Chengyu, Wang, Yu
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:•Cloud Manufacturing is facing challenges of uncontrollable quality caused by ‘random matching’ transactions.•Designed and compared three quality incentive mechanisms for cloud manufacturing platform operators.•Analyzed the necessary conditions for effectively implementing these quality incentive mechanisms.•Reward and Punishment strategy outperforms the Direct Subsidy strategy under identical incentive intensities.•Cost Sharing Incentive strategy and Reward and Punishment strategy each have their own advantages under certain conditions. Cloud Manufacturing (CMfg) is growing rapidly but facing challenges of uncontrollable quality caused by “random matching” transactions. This study concentrates on how a CMfg platform operator can offer quality incentives to capability providers, thereby facilitating the delivery of high-quality services. Initially, game theory is employed to construct the decision-making objective functions for both platform operator and capability providers. Building on this, three incentive mechanisms are proposed: direct subsidy (DS), cost sharing (CS), and quality reward and punishment (RP); furthermore, the conditions necessary for effectively implementing these mechanisms are analyzed. Concurrently, the incentive effects of the three mechanisms are examined and compared to offer guidance for the platform operator in selecting appropriate quality incentive strategies. Ultimately, employing numerical simulation analysis, the incentive effects of the three mechanisms and a sensitivity analysis of crucial parameters affecting the selection of incentive strategies are conducted, thereby validating the theoretical model’s analytical conclusions. The study reveals that these mechanisms can effectively motivate capability providers to enhance quality, yet under identical incentive intensities, the RP strategy outperforms the DS strategy. Furthermore, the platform operator tends to favor the CS strategy under conditions such as higher price set, advanced technology level of the platform, fewer capabilities, greater emphasis on QoS, lower cost coefficient of QoS, and a larger number of incentivized providers.
ISSN:0360-8352
DOI:10.1016/j.cie.2024.110681