Investment and pricing in solar photovoltaic waste recycling with government intervention: A supply chain perspective
The upcoming end-of-life (EoL) solar photovoltaic (PV) waste stream is a huge concern because of environmental and economic factors. However, previous studies have focused on recycling technology and environmental impacts but have ignored recycling policies and regulations on solar PV module waste m...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Computers & industrial engineering 2023-03, Vol.177, p.109044, Article 109044 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | The upcoming end-of-life (EoL) solar photovoltaic (PV) waste stream is a huge concern because of environmental and economic factors. However, previous studies have focused on recycling technology and environmental impacts but have ignored recycling policies and regulations on solar PV module waste management. Because of the low economic benefits and uncertain investment costs of solar PV modules recycling, we investigate the investment and pricing decisions in this process from a supply chain perspective, and a PV module reverse supply chain is established. Then, using a game-theoretical approach, we derive the formal processor’s capacity investment levels and pricing decisions, as well as each collector’s pricing and channel strategies in solar PV recycling. Finally, we analyze the effects of the cost parameters on optimal decisions and the transmission mechanism of government intervention. The results indicate that, for low-cost investments, subsidies are more efficient than penalties, whereas, for high-cost investments, either policy has positive effects on the formal treatment rate of waste PV modules. Therefore, this study will be helpful to choose a more appropriate waste PV recycling strategy in their actual recycling practices.
•A photovoltaic (PV) reverse supply chain framework is proposed for the first time.•Government intervention through the subsidy-penalty mechanism is considered.•The interaction decisions of the formal processor and competing collector are analyzed.•For low-cost investments, the subsidy has a positive effect on the formal channel.•For high-cost investments, there are negative influences of penalties on collectors. |
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ISSN: | 0360-8352 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.cie.2023.109044 |