The effect of preferential teaching and memory on cooperation clusters in interdependent networks

The inheritance of knowledge is of great significance to populations. Whether memory-based participants can propagate reasonable strategy during the process of evolutionary game is still an interesting topic. Meanwhile, cooperators converge into complex cluster structures accompanied with the evolutionary process, which can in turn considerably affect the cooperation behaviors. Hence, the dynamics of strategy clusters is significantly important for the emergence of cooperation. In view of the interdependent networks, we mainly studied the evolution of cooperation and defection clusters. Game participants in system are endowed with restricted memory and preferential teaching mechanism. Through variety of ways to analyze, we find that moderate memory and preferential teaching are beneficial to cooperative behaviors, and cooperators (defectors) with the ability of preferential teaching tend to be leaders of strategy clusters. Furthermore, by quantitative and qualitative discussions, the behaviors and characteristics of so-called leaders in system have been revealed. And, by means of information entropy, the complexity of the cooperation clusters has been further analyzed. Finally, the robustness of the results is verified by using different social game models.