Within Reason

Recently, thinkers not known for their relativist or sceptical tendencies have raised serious doubts about the objectivity of rule-following judgements. While they may not have given up on the objectivity of rule-following, they find themselves unable to account for it and see no definite prospect of a plausible solution. According to them, the most natural model of rule-following – called the ‘modus ponens model’ – is not capable of accounting for our rule-following practice because it is, they claim, undermined by two structural flaws: namely, the circularity objection and the regress objection. In this paper, I argue that a correct account can be found in the later Wittgenstein’s views regarding rule-following. I will show that once a clear understanding pertaining to bedrock and the ground of our rule-following practice in Wittgenstein is reached, we possess the elements to re-establish the objectivity of rule-following and in the process save the modus ponens model.