Alexander of Hales on the Ethics of Vigilantism

Very little has been published on the topic of vigilantism within recent applied ethics. Part of this dearth may be due to a perception that the issue lacks historical moorings, with little in the way of precedent in prior philosophical literature. However such a perception would be inaccurate; in f...

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Veröffentlicht in:Philosophia (Ramat Gan) 2020-04, Vol.48 (2), p.535-545
1. Verfasser: Dumsday, Travis
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Very little has been published on the topic of vigilantism within recent applied ethics. Part of this dearth may be due to a perception that the issue lacks historical moorings, with little in the way of precedent in prior philosophical literature. However such a perception would be inaccurate; in fact there are interesting discussions of vigilantism in the history of philosophy. By way of illustration, this article examines an early treatment of the topic by the influential (though today oft-neglected) thirteenth-century Franciscan thinker, Alexander of Hales. Hales’ perspective reflects what would become a fairly general mediaeval consensus against the permissibility of vigilantism (or at least vigilantism involving deadly force). His discussion is interesting on its own account, but the main goal of this study is to help spur further historical inquiries – and perhaps by extension to prompt further interest in vigilantism within current applied ethics.
ISSN:0048-3893
1574-9274
DOI:10.1007/s11406-019-00093-5