Heights of Representative Systems: A Proof of Fishburn's Conjecture
Representative systems with n-voters are hierarchical choice functions from {— 1,0,1}n to {— 1,0,1} constructed as iterations of weighted majority voting. The height of a representative system is the minimal number of iterations necessary for this construction. In the paper we give an upper bound fo...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | Social choice and welfare 1984-08, Vol.1 (2), p.149-158 |
---|---|
1. Verfasser: | |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Zusammenfassung: | Representative systems with n-voters are hierarchical choice functions from {— 1,0,1}n to {— 1,0,1} constructed as iterations of weighted majority voting. The height of a representative system is the minimal number of iterations necessary for this construction. In the paper we give an upper bound for μ(n) the maximal height of any n-voter representative system, and show that $\frac{{\mu (n)}} {n}$ goes to zero as n goes to infinity, n thus proving a conjecture made by Fishburn. Technically, the results are obtained by transferring the problem to the context of proper simple games, which have a similar hierarchical structure, and using known results on heights of simple games. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 0176-1714 1432-217X |
DOI: | 10.1007/BF00452886 |