Heights of Representative Systems: A Proof of Fishburn's Conjecture

Representative systems with n-voters are hierarchical choice functions from {— 1,0,1}n to {— 1,0,1} constructed as iterations of weighted majority voting. The height of a representative system is the minimal number of iterations necessary for this construction. In the paper we give an upper bound fo...

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Veröffentlicht in:Social choice and welfare 1984-08, Vol.1 (2), p.149-158
1. Verfasser: Keiding, H.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Representative systems with n-voters are hierarchical choice functions from {— 1,0,1}n to {— 1,0,1} constructed as iterations of weighted majority voting. The height of a representative system is the minimal number of iterations necessary for this construction. In the paper we give an upper bound for μ(n) the maximal height of any n-voter representative system, and show that $\frac{{\mu (n)}} {n}$ goes to zero as n goes to infinity, n thus proving a conjecture made by Fishburn. Technically, the results are obtained by transferring the problem to the context of proper simple games, which have a similar hierarchical structure, and using known results on heights of simple games.
ISSN:0176-1714
1432-217X
DOI:10.1007/BF00452886