Internalization and Regionalization of Sanctions Policy: The Case of the Czech Republic

As the enforcement of obligations in international relations is not fully governed by an international or supranational authority, sanctions represent a tool by which states can put through their rights and interests. Smaller states are limited in the enforcement of their claims by various power asy...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Europolis, Journal Of Political Science And Theory Journal Of Political Science And Theory, 2012, Vol.6 (1 (11)), p.7-29
Hauptverfasser: Druláková, Radka, Trávníčková, Zuzana, Zemanová, Štěpánka, Rolenc, Jan Martin
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:As the enforcement of obligations in international relations is not fully governed by an international or supranational authority, sanctions represent a tool by which states can put through their rights and interests. Smaller states are limited in the enforcement of their claims by various power asymmetries, including the threat of possible counter-actions or the worsening of economic and foreign-trade performance. They rely on collective action on the international level rather than on self-help. Regardless of the mixed records of multilateral sanctions effectiveness, they have become important for many small states. Since the Czech Republic belongs to such cases, its sanctions activities are strongly influenced by international organizations, namely the EU and the UN, and partially by the OSCE. The article examines the validity of the assumption that it was primarily the authority of the European Union which induced the recent changes within the Czech sanctions policy and created the conditions for an increased efficiency of the mechanisms for imposing sanctions by the country as a state participating in sanctions regimes (in the role of a sender of sanctions).
ISSN:1582-4969